Privacy · Security · Independence
SMEP Protocol
Secure Message Encoding Protocol
Local, account-free message encryption for private communication.
Encrypt a Message
Enter a secret key and your message to create a self-contained encrypted package.
Copy this package and send it through the channel of your choice. Share the secret key separately.
Decrypt a Message
Use the same secret key and encrypted package to recover the original message locally.
User Guide
How to Use the Secure Message Encoding Protocol
SMEP is a lightweight browser-based tool for encrypting message content without requiring an SMEP account, mobile app, or SMEP-hosted message database.
Why SMEP Exists
Many communication services combine message security with an identity account, application ecosystem, or centralized storage layer. SMEP separates the encryption step from the transport channel. You encrypt the content first, then move the encrypted package through email, SMS, chat, a document, or another channel.
The privacy benefit is narrower and more precise than “total anonymity”: the transport provider does not need access to the plaintext in order to carry the package. The provider may still observe communication metadata.
How to Encrypt and Share a Message
- Create a long unique secret, or use Generate Strong Key.
- Enter the message and select Encrypt Message.
- Copy the resulting SMEP package and send it through any convenient communication channel.
- Give the recipient the secret key through a separate trusted channel when practical.
- The recipient opens SMEP, chooses Decrypt, enters the key and package, and decrypts locally.
What SMEP Protects
- Message content while it is inside the encrypted package.
- Integrity of SMEP 3.0 ciphertext through AES-GCM authentication.
- Independence from a SMEP identity account or SMEP message database.
- Portability: the package can be copied through many transport channels.
What SMEP Does Not Protect
- Sender/recipient identity, IP address, timestamps, device data, or other transport metadata.
- A compromised browser, malicious extension, keylogger, or modified website code.
- A weak, reused, disclosed, or intercepted secret key.
- Screenshots, clipboard history, backups, or plaintext saved elsewhere.
- Automatic HIPAA, legal, records-retention, or organizational compliance.
Key Handling
The secret is the most important part of the system. A short human-chosen phrase can be guessed even when AES-256 itself is strong. SMEP 3.0 therefore includes a cryptographically random key generator and applies PBKDF2 to human-entered secrets before deriving the AES key.
- Prefer the generated key or a long passphrase that is not reused anywhere else.
- Do not send the key beside the ciphertext when a separate channel is available.
- Do not store secrets in public notes, shared cloud documents, or screenshots.
- Lost keys cannot be recovered by SMEP. There is deliberately no password-reset service.
Technical Design — SMEP 3.0
| Authenticated cipher | AES-256-GCM |
|---|---|
| Key derivation | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 |
| New-package work factor | 600,000 iterations |
| Salt | 16 random bytes per encryption |
| IV / nonce | 12 random bytes per encryption |
| Authentication tag | 128-bit AES-GCM tag, included with ciphertext by Web Crypto |
| Browser API | Web Crypto API in a secure HTTPS context |
| Package format | Versioned JSON containing algorithm/KDF metadata, salt, IV, and ciphertext |
Backward Compatibility
Existing SMEP 2.0 messages used AES-256-GCM with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 at 100,000 iterations and an unversioned JSON package containing ciphertext, salt, and iv. SMEP 3.0 preserves a legacy decryption path for those packages while using the stronger versioned format for new encryption.
Open Science, Open Tools, Open Challenge
SMEP intentionally uses standard cryptographic primitives rather than a proprietary cipher. The purpose is auditability: security researchers and developers should be able to inspect the implementation, test assumptions, identify weaknesses, and improve the tool.
The useful claim is not that any implementation is “unbreakable.” The useful claim is that SMEP exposes a small, inspectable attack surface built on established browser cryptography, and invites practical attempts to find implementation weaknesses.
Information-Physics Connection
Within Creation Unified’s informational-physics framework, SMEP is an application example of separating information transformation from transport ownership. The ciphertext can be carried by infrastructure that does not need the secret required to reconstruct the plaintext. This is a framework interpretation of the architecture; the security of the implementation still depends on standard cryptographic analysis and operational key handling.
Practical Uses
SMEP can be useful when people want an additional content-encryption layer across incompatible communication systems—for example research collaboration, confidential business notes, source protection, personal messages, or transferring sensitive text between parties who have already established a secret.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does SMEP make me anonymous?
No. SMEP does not require an SMEP identity account, but the transport channel may still expose identity and metadata.
Can Creation Unified recover my key?
No. SMEP deliberately does not store keys or provide recovery. If the secret is lost, encrypted messages cannot be recovered through SMEP.
Can I reuse the same secret?
You can decrypt multiple messages with the same secret because every encryption receives a fresh salt and IV, but compartmentalizing secrets limits the impact of one secret being exposed. Use separate secrets for unrelated contexts when practical.
Why is the encrypted package longer than the message?
The package includes ciphertext plus the salt, IV, algorithm version, and KDF metadata needed to derive the same key and authenticate the message.
Does SMEP work over HTTP?
Modern browsers expose Web Crypto only in secure contexts. Use the tool over HTTPS.
Is SMEP a replacement for Signal or another secure messenger?
No. SMEP is a portable content-encryption utility. Full secure messengers also handle authenticated identity, key exchange, contact discovery, device security, forward secrecy, metadata protections, updates, and other operational concerns.
